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BOOK REVIEWS
INTERNATIONAL LAw AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGiT. By
Manuel R. Garcia-Mora.- Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956.
Pp. vi, 171. $4.50. This book deals ".. . only with territorial asylum
for two obvious reasons: (1) because it is with territorial asylum
that international law is presently concerned, and (2) because
exterritorial asylum is at' 2best a local usage not yet part of universal international law.
The chapters of the book present successively the problems of
asylum and of the individual in international law; the positive
theory in this field, the natural law theory and the doctrine of
the "founders of international law." The author by-passes
Vitoria and studies the teachings of Suarez, Grotius, Pufendorf,
Wolff and Vattel, and then analyzes the competence of the state to
grant asylum, taking into account the conception of the state as
the agent of the World Society and the trustee of the individual.
He outlines the doctrines of extradition as a counterpart of
asylum. Discussing asylum and common crimes, he analyzes the
law of the United States and Great Britain, and the law and
practice of several other countries. He then speaks about asylum
in connection with extraditable offenses and about the doctrine of
double criminality. In the important chapter VI, concerning the
asylum and political offenses, the author presents the historical
development of the issue and he analyzes the nature of political
offenses.
In the following chapters he deals with deserters and prisoners
of war and with the problem of their asylum; with the right of
asylum vis-a-vis the state of refuge; and with the prosecution for
a crime other than that for which extradition was granted. He
carefully studies the right of asylum under international instruments and domestic enactments, paying much attention to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the problem of
limitations on the power of the state to admit and to expel aliens.
He also gives examples of the right of the individual to asylum
under the municipal law of some states.
The subject of the book is connected with complex problems
such as sovereignty of states, international personality of individ-

I Associate Professor of Political Science and Vice-Chairman of the
Political Science Department, University of Detroit.
2 Text at 1. These reasons do not seem obvious. It would perhaps simply
suffice to say that since the subject is a vast and complex one, the author
chose to concentrate on the problem of territorial asylum. The reviewer is in
favor of the term "diplomatic" asylum rather than "exterritorial" asylum
since every asylum is exterritorial in fact or in legal fiction.
3 Of course, this is incorrect terminology. The author presents the
outline of teachings of the founders of the science of international law.
(346)
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uals, and the relationship between internation law and municipal law. The author courageously attacks them and clearly presents his point of view.
In the opinion of the author,

"...

a major weakness of inter-

national law in this regard consists in its failure to recognize
asylum as a human right. As the traditional doctrine goes, asylum
is a right of the state and not of the individual."4 In his opinion,
it is ".

.

. perhaps not premature to assert that the United Nations

Charter has made the individual a subject of rights and freedoms
directly under the law of nations."5 However, in the opinion of the
reviewer, no provision of the Charter confers directly upon the
individual such international personality. Only the member states
are subjects of the pertinent provisions of the Charter and human
rights and freedoms are the object of these provisions. In the
Charter, the state still remains between international law and the
individual. No right is accorded in the Charter to the individual
to claim directly his human rights before an international body
and no international enforcement of these rights is stipulated by
the Charter.
The author ascertains that

"...

the competence to grant asylum

is deeply rooted in the principle of territorial sovereignty .... "'
He states that "it is indicative of the unsatisfactory nature of international law that so much emphasis should be placed, even in
modern times, upon asylum as a liberty of the state instead of as
a right of the individual."7 This notion practically is exempted
from all legal obligations and it results in the unilateral application of asylum by the states.
The author believes that, although,
...the concept of political offenses should not be so absolute as to
include all crimes committed in times of revolution or civil war, it
must be strongly emphasized that further restrictions in this direction are likely to deprive the right of asylum of all its urgency and
vitality, precisely at a time when its humanitarian function is most
desperately needed. 8

He is correct when stressing that, in marked contrast with the
liberal provisions of many Western constitutions, the constitutions
of the countries behind the Iron Curtain offer a right of asylum
only to a special category of political refugees. The European
countries under Soviet domination use almost identical language
with that of Article 129 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936 to
4 Text at 3.
5 Id. at 15.
6 Id. at46.
*

Id. at 3.

8 Id. at 93.
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describe the right of asylum.9
The author vigorously stresses in his final conclusion that:
_.. if there is to be protection of human rights, it is conditio sine
qua non that individuals count on means of enforcement and protection either from a world organization or from countries other than
their own. Unless such an alternative is erected into a human right,
the system currently designed to protect human beings will fall far
behind reasonable expectations and might finally go down in history
as one more design buried in the rubbish of human endeavor.' 0
Professor Garcia-Mora has presented a synthesis embracing an
extremely vast scope of subjects and problems. The book, demonstrating very extensive research, is replete with valuable footnotes, pointing out general literature on international law and
asylum as well as pertinent cases and texts of international and
municipal law. 1 The author could not present all the possible
problems and issues involved in the right of asylum. However,
the reviewer believes that in the second edition of this valuable
book, Professor Garcia-Mora might take into consideration the
following problems: (1) The legal situation of persons to whom
asylum has been granted and the problem of statelessness. The
refugees generally consider themselves as stateless because they
are willing to eliminate any interference in their fate by the
diplomatic or consular authorities of the country from which they
fled. (2) The protection of the rights of persons who sought
asylum by the state which granted asylum as opposed to a third
state. Stateless individuals-mostly those who have sought asylum
-who travel to a third state do not enjoy any consular or
diplomatic protection in this third state, even if they secured a
re-entry permit to the country which granted asylum and permanent residence. International law does not provide for a
positively determined competence of the state in protecting
persons to whom it granted asylum when they are abroad. (3)
The scope of the right of asylum as a human right. This right,
sought by the author, should consist not only in the right to ask
for and to be granted asylum in a foreign state, but also in the
9 Cf. Article 75 of the Soviet-imposed Constitution of Poland, authorized
on July 22, 1952. This article reads: "The Polish People's Republic grants
asylum to citizens of foreign states persecuted for defending the interest of
the working people, for struggling for social progress, for activities in
defending peace, for fighting for national liberation, or for scientific
activities."
30 Text at 167.
11 It is obvious that the author could not cite all the publications in this
field, but it is possible that he overlooked Le Probleme des Apatrides by
Professor Georges Langrod. This publication was edited by the Institutedes
Hautes Etudes Internationales de l'Universite de Paris in 1953 and is mentioned because it analyzes deeply the present juridical aspects of international law and asylum.
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protection of the refugee against encroachments of this foreign
state. It should also consist in the right to be positively protected
in the field of civil law, if not against the former country of the
refugee, then at least against a third country, in addition to the
case where the interested individual does not sojourn in this
m
country.3
(4) The burden imposed by the right of asylum on the
state which grants asylum. The right might endanger the political
and economic situation of the country where asylum is sought.'3
(5) The economic and social standing of the refugees. Such status
became, in the Soviet orbit, a justification for persecution, and in
theory and practice former "capitalists" were or are considered
as political foes. Thus, their social standing enables them to seek
asylum for political reasons. On the other hand, in the countries
behind the Iron Curtain, considered as political prisons of a great
majority of their inhabitants, anyone who is willing and able to
flee abroad is authorized today to ask for asylum. The escapes are
difficult, but suppose they were easy? Would the foreign countries
be obliged to admit millions of desperate human beings, virtually evacuating their homelands and leaving them in the hands
of the occupying oppressor and his native agents? (6) The danger
threatening a refugee. Should the objective danger threatening a
refugee be taken into account by the country in which he is seeking asylum or should credit be given to the subjective danger, i.e.
to the feelings of the interested person?%A (7) Refugees fighting
against their homeland. Totalitarian states have enlisted into
their armies maillions of men belonging to nationalities of the
occupied countries. When asked to fight against the cause of their
homeland, they should be authorized by international law to seek
and be granted asylum, even if they are not prisoners of war.
These and similar questions seem to be of great importance in
the theory and practice of international law today. If the volume
32 Consider this example: Western Germany indemnifies damages caused
by the Hitlerite regime to life and property of hundreds of thousands of
foreigners. A considerable percentage of this group is made up of people
who fled from or did not return to the countries behind the Iron Curtain
for political reasons.
3 On December 1, 1956, the number of Hungarian refugees admitted
to Austria, according to the rules of customary international law which
consecrates political asylum, constituted one and a half per cent of the total
population of Austria, a country with very limited economic resources. The
whole free world helped, headed by the United States, Great Britain and
France. This was an act of international brotherhood of free peoples and not
an implementation of any existing rules of international law.
14 For several years, Western German authorities asked the refugees
from Eastern Germany to prove that they were personally endangered.
Favorable economic conditions in Western Germany have since made it
possible to waive this question and to accept all refugees seeking asylum.
However, the problem as such is still in existence.
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of the book could not have been enlarged, they should have been
presented even at the expense of the historical chapters which
occupy one quarter of the book. Nevertheless, Professor GarciaMora has presented the subject in a most interesting and capable
manner, and the book is very instructive to students of the
world situation.
Marek St. Korowicz*

TE WORLD OF MATHEMATICS. Edited by James R. Newman.'
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956. 4 Volumes. Pp. xviii,
2535. $20.00. This work has been described as "the most extensive collection ever published, for layman and expert, of the
great literature of Mathematics from the Rhind Papyrus of
Egypt to Einstein's theories."2 Indeed, it is all of that. However,
it might seem puzzling that a set of books concerned with mathematics is being reviewed in a periodical devoted to law. To this
query there are two answers. First, Mr. Newman's work goes
a long way toward fulfilling the practical need of the modern
lawyer to know more about the nature of mathematics. Secondly,
and this all-important facet should not be ignored, Mr. Newman
deals with a subject which should appeal to all those trained in
the rigorous mental discipline of legal reasoning.
We live in a world where mathematics, natural sciences, and
technical accomplishments are at a premium. Furthermore, this
is an age of specialization. Thousands of lawyers are engaged
in the practice of their profession in fields where a knowledge
of mathematics and science is not only useful, but essential. This
is true, for example, in the practice of public utility law, tax
law, radio law, air law, and patent law. Such lawyers must cope
with problems involving scientific and technical facts which can
be properly understood only in terms of mathematical fundamentals. In dealing with such problems, lawyers come into contact with engineers, accountants, geologists, rate experts, and
technically trained experts in other fields. Mere knowledge
of the law is not enough. Counsel must also understand the
technical facts involved. These volumes will not furnish the
lawyer with a practical understanding of basic mathematics,
but they can serve as a prelude to further reading and

* Professor of Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford,
Mass.
1 Member of the New York Bar and Member of the Board of Editors
of "Scientific American."

2 Chicago Sunday Tribune, Book Section, October, 1956.
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study which will lead to such comprehension of this fundamental discipline. If one learns the nature of a subject and obtains an appreciation of its historical development, his curiosity
and interest must, of necessity, be aroused. The next and logical
step is the acquisition of deeper knowledge.
There is nothing strange about the fact that many lawyers
should seek an understanding of mathematics. Persons engaged
in non-mathematical, non-scientific pursuits, have made interesting and worthwhile contributions to this sphere of knowledge.
Thus, in the present work, the celebrated playwright, George
Bernard Shaw, contributes a gem entitled "The Vice of Gambling
and the Virtue of Insurance,"3 and the Reverend Edwin A.
Abbott one on "Flatland,"4 a romance of many dimensions.
The one hundred thirty-three selections in the editor's four
books reflect fifteen years of painstaking work which is obviously a labor of love. The range of the books, essays, stories
and mathematical diversions garnered in these volumes is farreaching. Archimedes of the ancient world rubs elbows with the
modern scientist Von Neumann. The headings of the various
parts in this work indicate its broad scope. Volume One comprises a general survey and a historical and biographical background of mathematics. Jourdain's book, "The Nature of Mathematics", 5 is reproduced in its entirety. The volume also contains writings of such masters as Rene Descartes on "The
Geometry"" and Alfred North Whitehead on "Mathematics as an
Element in the History of Thought."7 Part IV of the volume is
devoted to the mathematics of space and motion and the reader
is introduced to topology, projective geometry, and the origin and
significance of geometrical axioms. Forbidding subjects? Quite
so, but treated in a most interesting and readable manner.
Volume Two encompasses mathematics and the physical world,
mathematics and social science, and the laws of chance. Here is
found Bernoulli's rare work on the "Kinetic Theory of Gases,""
and that of Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington on "The New Law of.
Gravitation and the Old Law."9 John Maynard Keynes,' 0 the
great economist, and Henri Poincare,"z the French genius in the
field of mathematics, provide articles on probability and chance.
3 Text at 1524.
4
*

6
7
8

9
10
11

Id. at 2385.
Id. at 4-71.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1380.
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Nor is the famed Malthus neglected, for in this volume there is
presented a selection entitled "Mathematics of Population and
Food."' 2
Volume Three contains a variety of materials on statistics and
design of experiments, the group theory, mathematics of infinity,
the structure of mathematics, the mathematical way of thinking,
mathematics and logic, the vocabulary of mathematics, and
mathematics as an art. Oswald Veblen,' 3 Richard Von Mises,' 4
and Ernst Mach 15 are representative of the writers found in this
volume.
Volume Four provides both serious articles on mathematics
and mathematical divertisements. It is a veritable potpourri.
John Von Neumann writes on the "Theory of Automata,"16 and.
another writer 7 concerns himself with mathematics in warfare.
The mathematics of aesthetics and a mathematical approach to
ethics are covered by George D. Birkhoff.s The relationship of
mathematics t6 literature finds its exponent in no less a personage
than Jonathan Swift who contributes a selection with the intriguing title of "Cycloid Pudding."' 9 There is also a sketch on "The
Law"2 0 by Robert M. Coates. Lest a lawyer reader of this review
conclude that this article is concerned with legal matters, he will
be disappointed. It deals with the law of averages, ".

.

. that

great, ancient rule that states that the actions of people in the
mass will always follow consistent patterns."2 1 Sir James Jeans
writes on
tuning forks and pure tones in his "Mathematics of
2
Music."£ Virtually the rest of Volume Four, in the editor's own

words, is devoted to "Amusements, Puzzles, Fancies," all, of
course, possessing a mathematical content.
Louis S. Goldberg, in an article23 attempting to simplify the
functions of accounting for lawyers, has stated:
The first of those misconceptions is to enshroud accounting in
mysticism. Accounting is thought to be some strange calling, some
far-off mode of thought, remote from the lawyer's understanding,
12 Id. at 1192. This selection is from Malthus' sixth edition of "An Essay
on the Principle of Population."
13 Id. at 1696. This article was written with John Wesley Young.

14

Id. at 1723.

20

Id. at 2268.

21
22

Id. at 2268.

15 Id. at 1787.
16 Id. at 2070.
17 Id. at 2138. This article was written by Frederick William Lanchester.
Is Id. at 2185 and 2198.
19 Id. at 2214.
Id. at 2278.
L. Goldberg, Accounting in a Nutshell, A Guide for Lawyers, 39'
A.B.A.J. 467(1953).
23

1957)

BOOK REVIEWS

moving in a sphere beyond his ken. The accountant is some odd
of the magician to
creature who wields a pencil like the wand 24
produce results baffling to all normal humans.
Certainly, if many lawyers consider accounting in the light of
Mr. Goldberg's apt characterization, then one can imagine how
"baffling" is their conception of mathematics and the role of mathematicians. Mr. Newman's work should do much to dispel the lack
of understanding of the forbidden subject of mathematics and
the aim of its great thinkers. Some of the selections provide
"tough going" even for those trained in mathematics; most of
them do not. The reasoning ability which a lawyer must have to
analyze facts and apply the law to the facts, or to interpret
law, gives him a head start in absorbing the information in
Newman's volumes. It may also be added that The World of
Mathematics, while not a substitute for the formal training
in the fundamentals of this science of numbers, should also
serve to remedy the progressive neglect and disinterest which
this basic discipline has received in so many schools and colleges.
Mr. Newman spreads a rich feast for the reader which can be
sampled for a lifetime. The volumes can be read profitably time
and again. The commentaries and notes by the editor are highly
informative and give the varied writings contained in the work
a continuity which might be lacking otherwise. The work also
contains more than 500 drawings, halftones, and facsimile reproductions, i.e., the reproduction in French of Descartes' first
page of the first book of his "La Geometrie."
It may be noted that the several printings of The World of
Mathematics have been increased by an additional 100,000 sets,
in view of the demand for this work. This reviewer hopes that
the legal profession is well represented among the added
purchasers.
Louis C. Kaplan*

WE THE JUDGES. By William 0. Douglas.1 New York: Doubleday & Son, 1956. Pp. 480. $6.00: Tagore Lectures, University of Calcuttd. This book contains the Tagore Lectures given personally
by Mr. Justice Douglas at the University of Calcutta in July,
1955. In this friendly manner, the United States has sought
24 Id. at 468.
* Member of

the Bar of the District of Columbia and the Bar of the
Supreme Court of the United States.

1

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
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to impart to India a greater knowledge of our legal system and
its role in the attainment of our ideals. We in turn acquire a
greater knowledge of India; for while the lectures of Mr. Justice
Douglas are primarily a detailed and instructive review of our
own judicial system and constitutional law, there is also a review of the decisions of the high courts of India, including all the
decisions of her Supreme Court to the spring of 1955. The latter
are relatively.few because India's Constitution came into being
only in 1949. However, even in these few years, her jurists have
used as authorities many decisions of our own Supreme Court,
thus bridging the longer period of their development here.
The lectures are twelve in number. In his foreward and first
lecture, Mr. Justice Douglas describes in brief the "melting pot"
that was, and to a lesser degree still is, America. Certain parallels
are also drawn between the United States and India. Each, for
example, holds to a rule of law rather than one of men, as evidenced in India by the influence of our judicial history upon her
courts. At the outset, the lecturer also disassociates himself from
Holmes' statement to Pollock that force is the ultima ratio, which
Mr. Justice Douglas says was:
• . . always at odds with the ethical concepts of law and justice
shared by large segments of the American community. It was also
always at war with the Gandhian philosophy that the power of the
soul could, indeed, be the most potent, positive force in the affairs
of men. In the sweep of history, justice is the ultima ratio ....
Jesus of Nazareth proved it by the vitality of the ideas he loosened
upon the western world.

Buddha did the same in Asia.2 Not so, he adds, of Communist
China, where, in contrast,

" ....

truth is partisan ..

.

It is good to renew through the lecturer's words the idealism
of a younger America, the land of freedom. While he is not
unreserved in praise and does not ignore imperfections, he does
picture in deserving terms the great hope America has been to
the oppressed. He rightly gives much credit to the public schools
in the "melting pot" process but omits entirely the performance
of private and religious schools. Many of the immigrants and their
children whom he recognizes as the ingredients of the growing
nation did not attend public schools. Catholic and other private
schools, built and maintained at great cost by the immigrants
and their children, have also made an incalculable contribution
to the "one history, one language, one loyalty" of which he
speaks.
The first lecture also draws the parallel of recognition by India
and the United States of the sovereignty of the people, which is
explicit in the constitutions of both countries, and there are ap2 Text at 15, 16.
3 Id. at 16.
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propriate references to the political philosophies of the early
leaders of the two nations. An interesting analysis. is presented
of the similarity of our Bill of Rights and many provisions of
the Indian Constitution. The latter are more detailed, due in
good part to the intervening application of our own broad constitutional provisions to numerous specific situations. Whereas
our framers left, detail to future legislative and judicial development, India has in her constitution taken advantage of the
principles which have evolved from the process of application and
interpretation of our constitution.
An important difference in the structure of the two governments should be noted. Under the system of checks and balances,
our executive is more independent and powerful than the executive branch of India. There, executive power is lodged principally in a council of ministers under a prime minister, rather than
in a president.
The four succeeding lectures lay a broad basis for the more
detailed analysis of decisions which is to follow. The second
lecture is entitled, "The Judicial Power," followed by "The
Dual System of Courts," "Legislative Prerogatives," and "The
Administrative Agency." These furnish a full description of what
might be called our total method of government in its several
branches, with differentiations and interesting comparisons of
the processes of India. In developing his analysis of the judicial
power, the lecturer traces its roots in pre-American history,
where, for example, the doctrine of sovereign immunity already
prevailed. He emphasizes that the judicial power is one, but only
one, of the powers which are applied to settle controversies. "The
executive and legislative departments have their own procedures and devices. For example, a question may arise whether
a Senator or Congressman should be seated in the Congress." 4
The same principle is applied in India, as is illustrated by a case
where the court refused to interfere with the management of
the internal affairs of the state legislature.5 Many other il-

lustrations, including judicial reticence in political affairs, are
enumerated and discussed as the lectures proceed into a full
description of our dual system of courts, state and federal,
their interrelationship with each other, and the law which each
applies. In this regard India differs. "The Supreme Court of India
does not limit its review to 'federal questions,' but also passes
on matters which' our Court would regard as non-reviewable
'state questions.' "
In his treatment of "Legislative Prerogatives," Mr. Justice
4 Id. at 55.
5 Singh v. Govind, 41 A.I.R. 319, text at 56.
6

Text at 109.
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Douglas points out that India again is like America in many
respects; for example, in provisions for parliamentary immunity and the implied power to investigate, ".....
deep
in the ancient practice of the British Parliament."7 The present
problem of delimiting the legitimate area and scope of this
power, and its possible abuse, is not ignored, nor is the relationship of its exercise to constitutionally protect individual rights.
The remaining seven lectures include a most impressive
analysis of significant constitutional provisions and their judicial
interpretations. Included are "The Commerce Clause," considered first in its "Reach and Limitations" and then in the context of "State vs. Federal Power,.... The Reach of Due Process,"
"The Fundamental Rights of Speech, Press and Religion," "The
Right to a Fair Trial," "Equal Protection," and finally, "The
Judiciary." These seven lectures as a whole convey to the
reader a deep conviction of the vitality of our constitutional
system. This appears not so much as a conscious objective, but
rather as an indirect effect of Mr. Justice Douglas' discussions,
analyses, and historical review. As the titles indicate, these
lectures are devoted to the interpretation and application of constitutional provisions expressed in general language, such as
"to regulate commerce among the several States," and those
broad principles which are at the heart of our Bill of Rights.
The last lecture, "The Judiciary," is largely a study of stare
decisis and judicial review, where high tribute is paid to the
moral prestige of the courts:
The confidence of the citizen in modern government is increased
by more, rather than less, judicial review of the administrative
process. It assures that basic unfairness will be corrected. And
the administrator who knows he must ultimately account to a
judicial body for his actions will tend to be a more responsible
public official.8

In those lectures devoted to the general formulation of constitutional principles such as the regulation of interstate and
foreign commerce, due process of law and equal protection of
the laws, some adopted for the economic regulation of a system
of private enterprise under a.federal system of government, and
others for the protection of personal dignity, we see that our
legislative and judicial branches have erected an intricate legal
structure of society, remarkable both in conception and progression. The role of the courts and through the courts, the roles
of particular persons-we the judges-has been far reaching.
This becomes vivid. Chief Justice John Marshall's conception of
7 Id. at 139.
8 Id. at 445.
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the federal commerce power permitted the nation to develop fully
on a national scale. Another chief justice, interpreting the same
clause, might have steered the nation into narrow channels,
hedged by a multiplicity of state controls. In the important area of
civil liberties, the Court's interpretation and application of the Bill
of Rights in the process of maintaining an ordered society while
preserving individual dignity and fundamental freedom has
varied according to the composition of the Court. This internal
variable necessarily continues. It is illustrated by current differences within the Court on the question whether the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
Bill of Rights in its entirety. Mr. Justice Douglas reviews this
controversy, shows the extent to which the Court has gone, the
further extent to which he himself would go, and gives a
discerning outline of the arguments on both sides. Thus, the
recurring importance of the views of those who adjudicate constitutional issues, as well as the importance of constitutional
language, is illustrated. While the desirability of continuity of
decision in constitutional questions is emphasized, nevertheless,
"A constitution states principles rather than rules; and the
principles, written in general terms, are designed not for one
era only but for the vicissitudes of time. The Constitution is a
compendium, not a code; a declaration of articles of faith, not a
compilation of laws." 9 As the lecturer makes explicitly clear,
it is not simply that times and circumstances change: the composition of the Court changes as well. However, operating to
restrain change is judicial respect for precedent, the desire for
stability, and, furthermore, the necessity for preserving the
essential nature of our American constitutional system and
our tradition as a free society. Judges must keep in mind that
change must still be constitutional change. This, as well as
the latitude permitted by the fact that it is a constitution which
is interpreted as well as applied, enables the essential integrity
of our society to be maintained.
One is tempted to give some special notice to the ninth lecture,
"The Fundamental Rights of Speech, Press and Religion." It is
especially interesting that the lecture makes clear that Jefferson's
9 Id. at 429. Perhaps it is worth noting here that this applies only to
certain general clauses, such as "due process of law," "unreasonable searches
and seizures," "the equal protection of the laws," and "to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the several states." The total structure
of the Constitution is made definite by many precise provisions, such as
those upon which depend the three great branches of government, the
composition of the Senate and the House, and the enumeration of legislative
and executive powers, together with the provisions defining the repository
of judicial power itself.
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insistence upon the value of free speech was in terms of protecting freedom of opinion. It was time enough, said Jefferson,
for civil government "... to interfere when principles break
out into overt acts against peace and good order; and ... truth
S.. is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error," the natural
weapons of truth being ".

. free argument and debate."' 0

It was freedom in this area that was the concern of Jefferson.
As Mr. Justice Douglas points out:
...neither American nor Indian law has ever sanctioned unrestrained and unlimited free speech. The laws of slander, libel
and blasphemy have deep roots in Anglo-American and AngloIndian law ....
When we start with freedom of speech, we start,
in other words, with a concept somewhat limited by reason of its
special history.
Of course, a person who utters obscene language can be punished.
Of course, one who defames another's character can be held to
account in a court of law. Jefferson knew these things. When he
spoke of freedom of speech, he described a different level of
discourse.
Jefferson meant, I think, that all subjects should be left open
for free and unlimited discussion and debate ....

No doubt we have not yet reached the end of constitutional
decision in this area. The problem persists. It seems clear that
the First Amendment will never be construed to permit a limitation upon "free argument and debate," but it does not appear that Jefferson himself can be brought to support a view
that everything except obscenity, slander, libel and blasphemy
was to have free rein. What he was insistent about did not cover
the present dissemination for commercial gain of much that
pollutes the sight and profanes the morals of the people, with
special aim at the young.
These lectures are a review of our constitutional judicial
history and, therefore, of a large segment of our whole history.
Judges, practitioners, and students in America will find them
of great value. Not only is there a breadth of subjects treated,
but each subject is treated by an analysis of relevant decisions.
There are welcome personal comments of the Justice, indicative
to a degree, though with restraint, of his own views. The
lectures are not used excessively as a medium of expression
of personal ideas, but rather as a formidable presentation to
fellow jurists and students in India of the generally successful
manner in which we have met the challenge of preserving
freedom under a written constitution, undei, a rule of law,
during many periods of great change. Thus viewed, the book
is heartening as well as studious. It conveys to the Ameri10
1

Id. at 308.
Id. at 308, 309.
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can reader, without pretentiousness, a story of success in constitutional law under which a great nation has lived in freedom,
constantly working to maintain it in a contest between divergent
points of view over what is a protected individual right and
what is a power in the hands of government. We may well believe that the Indian audience also gained reassurance and
help from these lectures. Their portrayal of the staunch character
of the decisions of the Indian courts upholding, with the courage
of an independent judiciary, a rule of law for India, surely lends
encouragement to the struggle of the Indian nation for a rule
of law which recognizes the fundamental rights of the individual
as well as the dues of society, with increased faith in the ability
of self government to meet the needs of both. The future will
be a better one for all of us if the two great nations walk closely
together in the realm of law, a chief medium of understanding
and of progress toward a peaceful era in justice. It was the
view of President Roosevelt, principal architect of the United
Nations, that the development of law through the Charter
might in the long run be the organization's greatest achievement
in promoting a peaceful world order.
Charles Fahy*
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BOOKS RECEIVED
BUSINESS
By Edith L. Fisch. New York: Oceana
Publications, 1956. Pp. 225. $3.95. A series of biographical
sketches concerning lawyers of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, who are past and present leaders in particular
fields of business.
ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS OF SMALL BUSINESSES. By Leonard
Sarner. (1956 Revision by Howell C. Mette). Philadelphia:
Committee on Continuing Legal Education, 1956. Pp. vi, 204.
$2.50. This dompact paperbound handbook, incorporating the
changes brought about by the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, presents practical solutions to the various problems
of business organization and acquisition.
LAWYERS IN INDUSTRY.

PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT.

By Seymour J.

Rubin. Balti-

more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. Pp. x, 108. $3.50. With
present day political and economic realities as a foundation,
the author considers the basic rights and obligations of
private foreign investment as viewed by foreign nations.
SMALL BUSINESS AT THE CROSSROADS. By Wilfred Lumer. Washington: Public Affairs Institute, 1956. Pp. vii, 81. $1.00. A
study of the causes for the alarming decline of small business
between 1953 and 1955, and a series of recommendations for
the alleviation of the threats to the "seedbed of American
business."
CIVIL LAW
THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD.

Edited by

Bernard Schwartz. New York: New York University Press,
1956. Pp. x, 400. $12.25. A series of papers, prepared by
eminent jurists for the sesquicentennial celebration of the
Code Napoleon, which survey the theory of the code as well
as its present status and its relation to contemporary legal
problems.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
By Samuel Eliot Morison.
Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1956. Pp. viii, 156. $3.50.
Admiral Morison examines political freedom, economic freedom and academic freedom and those forces which threaten
to restrict and destroy them.

FREEDOM IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY.

*

Reviewed in this issue.
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By Robert A. Horn. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1956. Pp. ix, 187. $3.00. A thorough
analysis of the freedom of association by a study of the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States involving applications of the First Amendment.
THE LAW AND ONE MAN AMONG MANY. By Arthur E. Sutherland. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956. Pp. ix,
101. $2.50. A presentation of the conflicting relationships of
man with his fellow men explaining the necessity of compromise in our society.
*WE THE JUDGES. By William 0. Douglas, New York: Doubleday, 1956. Pp. 480. $6.00.
GROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION.

CRIMINAL LAW
By Edward N. Bliss, Jr. Springfield,
Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1956. Pp. xi, 304. $6.50. An examination of the function of criminal defense investigation
including valuable case studies from the author's own experience.

DEFENSE INVESTIGATION.

ENGINEERING
By Melvin Nord. New York:
Wiley and Sons, 1956. Pp. ix, 391. $7.50. By reducing the
number of legal terms to a minimum, the book presents a
simplified survey 'of the many aspects of the law with which
practising engineers should be conversant.

LEGAL PROBLEMS IN ENGINEERING.

FEDERAL TAXATION
Charles L. B. Lowndes
and Robert Kramer. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1956. Pp.
xxii, 1028. $25.00. In writing for the tax expert, the general
practitioner, and law student, the authors accomplish a
balanced explanation of the substantive and procedural
features of this branch of federal taxation.

FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES. By

FICTION
By Bernard Botein. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1956. Pp. 273. $3.50. A novel describing the thoughts
and feelings of a young assistant district attorney who uses
his position to further his quest for power.

THE PROSECUTOR.

INTERNATIONAL LAW
HUMAN RIGHT. By
Manuel R. Garcia-Mora. Washington: Public Affairs Press,
1956. Pp. vi, 171. $4.50.

*INTERNATIONAL

LAW

AND

* Reviewed in this issue.

ASYLUM

AS

A

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Vol. XXXHI

By Philip C. Jessup. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1956. Pp. 113. $3.00. Storrs Lectures on
Jurisprudence. The author explains the necessity for the
extension of the scope of international law in order to cope
with the increased complexities of contacts between nations.
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HuMAN RIGHTS. By James F. Green.
Washington: Brookings Institution, 1956. Pp. viii, 194. $1.50.
A discussion of the relationship of the United Nations organization to some of the basic human rights.
TRANSNATiONAL LAw.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
DELINQUENCY:

THE

JUVENILE

OFFENDER

IN

AMERICA

TODAY.

By Herbert A. Bloch and Frank T. Flynn. New York: Random
House, 1956. Pp. xix, 612. $7.95. The reasons for one of
America's growing problems are set out and proposed solutions offered.
LIBEL AND SLANDER
SAY IT SAELY. By Paul P. Ashley. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1956. Pp. x, 117. $2.25. A valuable working handbook for members of the journalistic and broadcasting industries to determine the bounds of lawful expression.
MATHEMATICS
*THE WoRD OF MATHE MATICS. Edited By James R. Newman.
New York: Simon and Shuster, 1956. 4 Volumes. Pp. xviii,
2535. $20.00.
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL MEDICINE. By Louis J. Ragan and Alan R.
Moritz. St. Louis: C. V. Mosby, 1956. Pp. 201 $3.90. This practical compact volume makes an attempt to eliminate the longstanding conflict between law and medicine so that by better
mutual understanding, justice can be administered more
certainly.
NATURAL LAW
JUSTICE. By Georgio Del Vecchio. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1956. Pp. xxi, 236. $6.00. In a rejection of legal
positivism, this noted author surveys various forms of juristic
philosophy, establishes his own ideas in light of the natural law
and then makes some applications of his theory, with a stress
on criminal justice.
*

Reviewed in this issue.

